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Introduction
In this paper, we focus on Poland and Spain 
in order to analyse the potential consequences 
at the sub-national level of a reversal of 
European economic integration. The latest 
Parliament Eurobarometer survey confi rms 
citizens’ growing support for European 
economic integration. In this survey (European 
Parliament, 2018), the 28 European member 
states (MS) have been positioned according to 
their views with reference to two dimensions. 
Firstly, ‘the right direction’ in their own country 
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and, secondly, ‘the right direction’ in the 
European Union (EU). The question asked 
is: ‘At the present time, would you say that, in 
general, things are going in the right direction 
or in the wrong direction, in…? (Our country/
EU)’. According to this survey, Poland is in 
the group of countries with the most positive 
perceptions in both dimensions (i.e. things are 
going in the right direction in both Poland and 
in the EU). On the other side of the spectrum, 
the Eurobarometer shows that citizens in 
Spain believe that things are taking the wrong 
direction, both in Spain and in the EU.
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) 
from the EU will have consequences not only 
in the UK, but also in MS that have established 
commercial links with the UK in many spheres 
of economy, i.e. migration (Simionescu, Bilan, 
Smrčka, & Vincúrová, 2017). Therefore, it is 
worth analysing if citizens’ perceptions are 
justifi ed by vulnerability towards exogenous 
events at the European level (such as Brexit). 
Recently, Brakman, Garretsen and Kohl 
(2018), with the use of data on value-added 
exports and counterfactual gravity equations, 
estimated in the hard Brexit scenario country-
level effects for Poland at ca. 1.9% loss and 
Spain at ca. 3.3% loss. This estimation situates 
Poland as a country moderately vulnerable 
to Brexit, whereas Spain becomes highly 
vulnerable (in line with the results obtained by 
the European Parliament, 2018). Our study 
contributes to this literature by presenting 
a sub-national analysis on the impact of Brexit 
for vulnerability within the area of foreign 
trade in non-UK sub-national regions (in what 
follows, we refer to regions). Including the 
deep structural characteristics of regions’ 
exports allows to thoroughly assess the Brexit 
consequences in the sphere of international 
trade and grasp inter-regional heterogenous 
Brexit repercussions. It constitutes the novelty 
of this research, as in other studies only 
general information on trade is used. Contrary 
to other studies, we do not limit our analysis to 
depicting exposure towards Brexit, but we also 
take into consideration regions’ sensitivity and 
adaptive capacity. Structural characteristics of 
a particular region, through its high adaptive 
capacity, can mitigate the foreseen shock 
stemming from Brexit. Thus, owing to the 
proposed approach, we can assess Brexit 
aftermath more comprehensively. So far, the 
study exemplifi es the case of two countries 
thereof, but defi nitely if statistical data would 
be available other studies may emerge.
We hypothesise that Brexit may have 
important and heterogeneous consequences 
for non-UK European regions. However, their 
scope and seriousness cannot be assessed 
precisely because the conditions on which it 
will take place are still being negotiated. The 
consequences are usually inquired at country 
level, while their regional dimension does not 
get the necessary attention. The research on 
the regional aspects of exporting, especially 
if done for a group of countries, is usually 
based on simulated data via input-output 
tables (Brakman et al., 2018; Chen et al., 
2018). Alternatively, we propose the use of 
not-simulated, 4-digit CN data on regional 
exports. The regional dimension of Brexit 
consequences is predominantly assessed for 
the British regions (Los, McCann, Springford, 
& Thissen, 2016; McCann, 2018). We fi ll the 
gap in the Brexit-related literature by applying 
the perspective of the regions of other EU 
countries, engaged in trading relations with the 
UK. Our approach subscribes into the point of 
view of those economists, that are of the opinion 
that ‘geography still matters’ (Capello, Caragliu, 
& Fratesi, 2018; McCann, 2018; Nazarczuk, 
Umiński, & Brodzicki, 2019) and due to many 
factors (incl. gravity, path dependency, foreign 
direct investments – FDI) some regions have 
developed relatively stronger commercial links 
with the British market than others.
A two-country framework is applied in order 
to obtain robust conclusions. Both countries are 
MS of the EU, similar in terms of population, 
number of NUTS-2 regions, similar geographical 
distance to the UK, and are not among the 
funding countries of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Despite these similarities, 
there are relevant differences between them. 
These are related to their membership in the 
Eurozone (Poland so far did not introduce the 
euro, and accessed the EU in 2004, while Spain 
accessed in 1986) and the kind of peripherality 
in the EU (in the South, in the case of Spain 
and in the East, in the case of Poland). Both 
countries share a border with a big, important 
EU member, which is France for Spain and 
Germany for Poland. We treat Brexit as an 
exogenous economic shock that will infl uence 
regions’ economies and will affect their welfare. 
The regional point of view is justifi ed because 
the Brexit consequences will be place-based, 
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dependent on the particular region character of 
trade relations with the UK. We focus on foreign 
trade relations as the main channel transferring 
this shock.
We do not aim at making the comprehensive 
inquiry into the Brexit consequences for the 
regions’ economies, as is done for example 
in gravity models using trade data to assess 
the welfare effects stemming from changing 
the trade regime when the UK will leave the 
EU (Felbermayr, Fuest, Gröschl, & Stöhlke, 
2017). Otherwise, we focus on the character of 
trade relations. It is worth mentioning, however, 
that owing to the on-going and deepening 
uncertainties towards Brexit, any analysis 
focused on Brexit consequences (including 
ours) has a certain bias.
The study shows the nature of the 
heterogeneous consequences of Brexit for 
the regions of Spain and Poland. The Brexit’s 
asymmetrical impact on regions’ economy 
through the export channel is a challenge for 
the regional policy and place-sensitive policies 
are needed (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), however, 
Brexit is rather perceived as a national problem. 
It is the role for regional institutions to monitor 
the vulnerability to the Brexit consequences and 
to facilitate adjustments of exporting companies 
that will be severely affected.
Spanish regions are more exposed to the 
Brexit consequences, i.e. more vulnerable, than 
Polish regions to the decreasing trade intensity 
with the UK. Otherwise, the regions of Poland 
are on average, more sensitive to the shock, 
which in the context of our research, relates 
to trade composition. As regards the adaptive 
capacity, systematic inter-country differences 
are seen, with Spanish regions being more 
prepared for the shock.
The remainder of the paper is organised 
as follows. The following section describes 
the theoretical background for the evaluation 
of vulnerability to Brexit. The paper proceeds 
by depicting the dataset, empirical strategy 
and hypotheses. Section 3 presents obtained 
results regarding the exposure to Brexit. Finally, 
it concludes by discussing the implications of 
the research.
1. Theoretical Background
 Several theoretical frameworks can be used to 
assess the consequences of Brexit for regions’ 
economies when the foreign trade relations are 
looked into. Leaving the EU means a reversal 
in economic integration, that is, a change of the 
trade regime from a customs union to a lower 
preferential scheme of trade relations. Thus, 
reversed trade creation and diversion effects 
are expected, which would justify making 
use of a ‘purely’ international trade (customs 
union) theory. When the regional dimension 
is at stake, New Economy Geography (NEG) 
is recommended, as Brexit will translate 
into increasing trade costs, because a less 
favourable trade regime will be applied. Also, 
gravity-based estimations could be applied, as 
gravity in fact has become the most frequently 
used framework for trade analysis, including 
inquiries into changes of trade regimes and 
institutions (see, for example, Brakman et 
al., 2018; Brodzicki & Umiński, 2017; Head & 
Mayer, 2014; Martínez-Zarzoso & Márquez-
Ramos, 2018).
We rely on the conceptual framework of 
vulnerability presented by Turner et al. (2003), 
further extended by Aversano-Dearborn, 
Beiglböck and Binot (2011). Originally, the 
vulnerability concept embraces three spheres: 
societal, economic and ecological. This three-
element model comprises: exposure, sensitivity 
and resilience, which together (including 
their inter-connections) describe the overall 
vulnerability to a specifi c phenomenon. Our 
research does not pretend to show a broad 
spectrum of Brexit consequences for regions’ 
economies. Instead, we focus on trade 
aspects of vulnerability, thus ecological and 
demographical factors are omitted.
Given the three dimensions of vulnerability, 
the role of the fi rst one is to indicate the 
exposure, which is the extent to which the 
economy may be affected by the incoming 
shock. It encompasses economic agents, 
households or the whole economy, by 
describing their postures against intensity, 
frequency or durance of potential crises. 
Exposure is not constant in time, which refl ects 
the changing trends in the global/national/
regional economies. The sensitivity mirrors 
the region’s behaviour towards exposure to 
the crisis (Aversano-Dearborn et al., 2011). 
Thus, it is mainly dependent on the regional-
specifi c characteristics, which determine how 
the negative stimuli and threats impact the 
economy and society (Frazier, Thompson, 
& Dezzani, 2014). These can stem from the 
specifi c composition of an industrial structure, 
trade characteristics and links with the global 
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economy. Contrary to the above, the adaptive 
capacity (or resilience) is a force supressing the 
extent to which a potential shock is mitigated. 
It defi nes the ability of a region to conform to 
the new (post-crisis) situation. Thus, it refl ects 
the capacity to decrease the scale of potential 
impact/exposure to the crisis or ability to deal 
with its consequences.
There is affl uent literature on the purely 
economic aspects of vulnerability and 
resilience (Patton, Xia, Feng, & Hewitt, 2016; 
Röhn, Sánchez, Hermansen, & Rasmussen, 
2015), in which research focused on how 
foreign trade and openness affect vulnerability 
is proliferating (Fingleton, Garretsen, & Martin, 
2015; Georgescu, 2015; Ayadi, Montigaud, 
Rastoin, & Tozanli, 2006; Röhn et al., 2015; 
United Nations, 2011). From the perspective 
of the assessment of vulnerability of regions’ 
economies to the consequences of Brexit, the 
literature devoted to the vulnerability of small 
states represents an inspiring approach that 
explicitly underlines the question of openness to 
trade (Briguglio, 2014, 2016a, 2016b; Briguglio, 
Cordina, Farrugia, & Vella, 2009; Briguglio & 
Vella, 2016; International Monetary Fund, 2013; 
Lewis-Bynoe, 2014).
The transposition of the vulnerability 
framework to the specifi c case of regions’ 
exposure to Brexit yields polarised results, which 
to a large extent are different from the general 
crisis-vulnerability framework. Although, the 
main components of the vulnerability setting 
remain the same, their character shifts towards 
exposure to bilateral trade relations among 
regions’ trade with the UK. Thus, within the 
general framework, our analysis is in the spirit of 
that performed by Zaucha, Ciołek, Brodzicki and 
Głazek (2014). However, our main contribution 
in this regard is its adjustment to the needs of 
evaluation of the vulnerability of regions to Brexit 
in the area of foreign trade.
We propose the following approach to 
investigate the vulnerability of non-UK regions to 
Brexit. The regional vulnerability is a function of 
two components: the impact (IMt) of Brexit and 
the regional adaptive capacity (ACt) to the shock, 
caused by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU:
Vt = f(IMt , ACt) (1)
where:
Vt – vulnerability to Brexit at (present) time t;
IMt – present impact of Brexit;
ACt – adaptive capacity to Brexit.
Regions, due to their economic and trade-
related diversifi cation, including bilateral 
interconnections, will be heterogeneously 
affected by the impact of the shock. The latter 
is dependent on: (i) exposure to the Brexit, and 
(ii) sensitivity to Brexit. The exposure is mainly 
conditioned on the intensity of trade relations 
with the UK; thus it can be proxied by the share 
of the UK in the region’s exports. The sensitivity, 
in the context of our research, relates to the 
composition of trade, that determines how 
the Brexit’s negative effects would impact 
the regions’ economy through the channel 
of foreign trade (Röhn et al., 2015). Hence, 
it encompasses the sectoral structure of the 
bilateral relations with the UK and the overall 
trade openness of regional economies.
Given the persistent nature of trade 
relations, originating from historical legacy, past 
investments (including activity of FDI), strategic 
decisions, comparative advantages and the role 
of metropolises (Brodzicki & Umiński, 2017) 
– the present impact of the Brexit, is strongly 
conditioned on the past conditions, which cannot 
be immediately changed. That is why the impact 
of the Brexit to regional economies equals:
IMt = g(Et , St) (2)
where:
Et – exposure to Brexit;
St – sensitivity to Brexit;
g –  symbol of a function of an unknown 
empirical form.
As it was noted above, the exposure to 
Brexit may be proxied by the share of exports 
sent to the UK, whereas sensitivity is the effect of 
the structure of the economy, established trade-
relations, including its specifi c composition 
within the exporting activity or the role of 
international trade in regional economies:
St = h(TRt , EXt) (3)
where:
TRt – overall trade openness index;
EXt – export product concentration to UK;
h –  symbol of a function of an unknown 
empirical form.
Structural characteristics have crucial 
importance in the assessments of regional 
vulnerability to foreign trade changes as well 
as consequences related to globalisation 
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(Bernatonyte, 2015; European Commission, 
2008). Particular products’ groups may have 
different elasticities towards trade cost changes 
(Márquez-Ramos et al., 2011), caused by 
an unknown Brexit scenario up until now. 
Therefore, we anticipate different behaviour of 
agricultural and high-tech products sent to the 
UK, given their specifi c role and importance 
to the UK economy and to Spanish and 
Polish regions’ exports. Rural areas, and rural 
remote regions in particular, experienced 
a disproportionate larger negative impact of 
the 2008 crisis, than urban areas (Patton et 
al., 2016). The transmission of the external 
economic shocks to the rural areas also goes 
through the trade channel:
EXt = (s_AGRIt , s_HTt) (4)
where:
s_AGRIt –  share of agricultural products in 
exports to the UK;
s_HTt –  share of high-tech products in exports 
to the UK.
Following Briguglio (2004; 2014), we 
treat exports concentration as a vulnerability 
component, as they increase the vulnerability 
to Brexit. Export concentration refl ects the 
character of the production base, which to 
a large extent is path dependent. Opposite to 
Briguglio et al. (2009), who argue that the small 
size of the economy signifi cantly restricts an 
ability to diversify exports, we treat regions as 
small economies, and diversifi cation chances 
stem from the entrance of new investors, 
especially with foreign capital that contribute 
to improvements in exports capacity. Many 
depend on the investment attractiveness and 
the character of the activity carried out by 
the new coming investors (assets creating 
vs. assets converting). Even if the structural 
characteristics of exports apparently do not 
change, much can happen inside particular 
sectors in the form of intra-industry adjustments. 
Competitiveness improvements, refl ected 
in exporting activity, can stem from shifts 
between horizontal and vertical intra-industry 
trade (IIT), including high quality vs. low quality 
vertical IIT components. A number of empirical 
studies show a positive correlation between 
export diversifi cation and economic growth 
(Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres & Ferrantino, 
2000; Herzer & Nowak-Lehnmann D., 2006), 
however, Naudé, Bosker and Matthee (2010), 
after a thorough literature overview on the 
nexus between economic growth and exports 
specialisation vs. diversifi cation, conclude that 
ambiguous conclusions can be formulated. 
For local economies, contrary to country level 
studies, export specialisation positively affects 
economic growth (Naudé et al., 2010) and 
export success (Nazarczuk et al., 2018). On 
the other hand, it is generally acknowledged 
that diversifi cation mitigates vulnerability too, 
for instance, commodity shocks, deteriorating 
terms of trade as well as fl uctuations of prices. 
Moreover, the endogenous growth theory 
indicates the positive consequences of exports 
diversifi cation through spillovers from high-tech 
products to other economy sectors (Herzer & 
Nowak-Lehnmann D., 2006).
The third vulnerability component, which is 
an adaptive capacity, encompasses regional 
heterogeneity in terms of the reaction towards 
Brexit. The set of determinants affecting elastic 
and dynamic changes within the trade setting, 
involves the ability of taking actions that can 
mitigate an upcoming (foreseen) decrease in 
the demand from the UK.
The region’s adaptive capacity is an 
outcome of a list of its determinants:
ACt = i(QoIt , FDIt , Innovt , HCt) (5)
where:
Qolt – quality of regional institutions;
FDIt –  the intensity of the FDI presence in 
a region;
Innovt – region’s innovative capacity;
HCt – the quality of human capital;
i –  symbol of a function of unknown empirical 
form.
The inclusion of the quality of regional 
institutions as one of the adaptive capacity 
determinants is motivated by the fact that 
effective business environment institutions 
facilitate international trade, by reducing risk 
and uncertainty, that in export transactions 
(vs. domestic ones) is higher (Bojnec, Fertő, 
& Fogarasi, 2014; Handley & Limão, 2017; 
Martínez-Zarzoso & Márquez-Ramos, 2018). 
Export performance can also be positively 
affected by promotional activity, carried on 
towards region’s fi rms (Gil, Llorca, & Serrano, 
2008; Teixeira & Barros, 2014). Another aspect 
is the attraction of foreign owned entities (FOEs) 
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to the region, which reveal a superior export 
performance, compared to indigenous fi rms 
(Mayer & Ottaviano, 2008; Nazarczuk & Umiński, 
2019; Nazarczuk & Umiński, 2018; Zhang & 
Song, 2001). FOEs, according to Forsgren 
(2008), perform a networking function. Being in 
the network of relations, they have a capability 
of offsetting the negative consequences of 
Brexit, through switching to more intensive trade 
relations with non-UK partners.
The negative consequences of Brexit can 
also be offset by the advantages that the region 
possesses in terms of innovation capacity and 
human capital. Some of the innovative capacity 
is brought to the region by FOEs. Although 
many FOEs apparently do not reveal the 
superior innovativeness performance over the 
domestic fi rms in terms of innovation outlays, 
their privileged position stems from the initial 
technology transfer (also in the tacit form) 
resulting from the ownership component of the 
OLI (ownership, localisation, internalisation) 
advantages (Dunning & Lundan, 2014). 
Innovativeness positively affects productivity, 
which – according to fi rms’ heterogeneity 
concept – translates into improved exports 
performance (Melitz & Redding, 2014). 
Innovativeness has many ‘faces’, it can manifest 
in a higher fl exibility to adjust to the Brexit 
consequences, i.e. in fi nding new markets, new 
marketing strategies and new (or improved) 
products offered. The research depicting the 
positive infl uences of innovativeness on exports 
performance has been presented, for example, 
by Chuang (2000), Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011), 
Altomonte, Aquilante, Békés and Ottaviano 
(2013), Cieślik, Michałek and Michałek (2014) 
as well as DiPietro and Anoruo (2006).
Exporting requires human capital that is 
why exporters tend to agglomerate, as they 
benefi t from sharing, learning and matching 
(Duranton & Puga, 2004). The process of fi rm’s 
internalisation through knowledge development 
was provided by Johanson and Vahlne (1977). 
Examples in research analysing the positive 
correlation between fi rms’ exports and human 
capital are Levin and Raut (1997), Grasjo 
(2008), Contractor and Mudambi (2008), 
Chuang (2000).
2 Data, Hypotheses and Empirical 
Approach
2.1 Data
The dataset used in the study is a compilation 
of data from a number of sources (Tab. 1).
Variables Description Source
  Share of exports sent to UK
  Share of agricultural products 
exported to the UK
  Share of high-tech products 
exported to the UK
  IIT of exports to UK
Regional trade data with 
country of origin and 
destination for NUTS-2 
regions
DataComex (for Spanish 
regions, available at 
http://datacomex.comercio.es) 
and Customs Chamber (for 
Polish regions)
  GDP
  Quality of regional institutions
  The share of population aged 
24–65 with tertiary education
NUTS-2 Quality of 
Government (QoG) Institute’s 
EU regional database
(Charron et al., 2016)
  FDI/GDP Performance Index The information of regions’ 
FDI was obtained from the 
Spanish Ministry of Economy 
and Competitiveness and 
from the Central Statistical 
Offi ce for Poland.
Spanish Ministry of Economy 
and Competitiveness;
Central Statistical Offi ce for 
Polish regions
  Innovative capacity, related 
to the EU mean innovation capacity
Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard dataset
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/
industry/innovation/facts-
fi gures/regional
Source: own elaboration
Tab. 1: Data sources used in the study
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Given the frequent missing data for two 
autonomous Spanish city-regions (Ceuta and 
Melilla), we exclude them from the fi nal analysis. 
The sole analysis is run in a cross-section due to 
data availability and character of the exposure to 
the future exogenous shock. However, obtained 
results on the potential exposure to Brexit are 
presented in-time to identify the changes in the 
scale of exports to the UK.
2.2 Empirical Approach 
and Hypotheses
Referring to the vulnerability concept, we aim 
to identify the potential regional vulnerability 
to Brexit, with particular reference to regions’ 
foreign trade activity. Thus, the authors set three 
specifi c aims in the study: (i) to set the analysis 
into the vulnerability concept theoretical 
foundations, (ii) to identify regions with diverse 
levels of vulnerability to Brexit, (iii) to provide 
a better understanding of the potential causes 
of Brexit to regions.
In the context of our research, trade is 
considered to be a prime platform of transmitting 
potential economic shock, caused by the UK 
leaving the EU. That is why we concentrate our 
attention on the sole trade-related effects for the 
regional economies of the two countries (Spain 
and Poland). Contrary to the majority of the 
empirical evidence, portraying comprehensive, 
but not-trade related consequences for the 
selected economies, we limit the analysis to 
the fi rst-round effects of this shock. The latter 
will be obviously dependent to a large extent 
on increase of trade costs and the reduction 
of bilateral trade among the UK and its trade 
partners.
In order to evaluate the potential vulnerability 
to Brexit, a synthetic vulnerability index is used. 
It relies on vulnerability indices constructed for 
vulnerability to economic shocks (Aversano-
Dearborn et al., 2011; Zaucha et al., 2014). 
The following selection of variables (Tab. 2), 
supplements the theoretical considerations on 
the vulnerability model, which are implemented 
in the vulnerability indicator. Their values 
were: (i) standardised to avoid the impact of 
different orders of magnitude as well as inter-
country differences and (ii) the directions of 
variables’ infl uence were corrected to avoid 
ambiguity. Thus, exposure and sensitivity are 
the two dimensions of the index increasing 
the vulnerability, whereas adaptive capacity 
counteracts to some extent this vulnerability. 
No particular weighting scheme was adopted, 
which resulted in the equal infl uence of 
particular variables to the resulting particular 
dimensions of the vulnerability. Similarly, 
when the fi nal impact is measured, being 
a conjunction of exposure and sensitivity, equal 
weights were utilised. The adopted approach 
stems from the lack of comprehensive similar 
studies in this fi eld, basing on which the authors 
could know the relevance of each variables/
components to the fi nal and foreseen Brexit 
Dimension of 
vulnerability Variables
Impact on Brexit 
vulnerability
Exposure Share of exports sent to UK +
Sensitivity Trade openness index = (exports + imports)/GDP
Export product concentration:
  Share of agricultural products exported to the UK
  Share of high-tech products exported to the UK
+
+
-
Adaptive 
capacity
Quality of institutions – EU Regional QoG index
FDI/GDP Performance Index*
IIT of exports to UK
Innovative capacity – EU Regional Innovation Scoreboard
Quality of human capital – proxied by the share of population 
aged 24-65 with tertiary education
-
-
-
-
-
Source: own
Note: * share of regional FDI infl ow in national infl ow divided by the share of regional GDP in the national GDP.
Tab. 2: Variables used with their potential impact on the Brexit vulnerability of regions
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consequences. Moreover, other authors 
indicate potential problems stemming from the 
inappropriate usage of weighting schemes. 
Discretionary defi ned weights could be 
criticized for subjectivity and bias the results 
(Cordina, 2004).
The classes for particular dimensions of 
vulnerability were obtained with the following 
clustering scheme: group 1: dimi ≥ dim + SDdim; 
group 2: dim ≤ dimi < dim + SDdim; group 3: 
dim – SDdim ≤ dimi < dim; group 4: dimi < dim 
– SDdim, where dim is a mean value of particular 
dimension and SDdim is a standard deviation of 
the indicator.
Next, using the synthetic index, we will test 
three hypotheses:
H1: There is a strong regional context of 
vulnerability to the consequences of Brexit that 
goes beyond country’s characteristics.
We treat regions as small open economies 
with clear comparative advantages profi les. 
Thus, these are the regional characteristics 
that matter more than country characteristics 
for export performance. Formulation of H1 
means that we expect the regions of Spain 
and Poland being ‘mixed’ within the particular 
clusters of vulnerability. Therefore, the results 
of the taxonomy shall not be country-biased.
H2: Metropolises have the highest adaptive 
capacity to Brexit shock.
Formulation of H2 brings our attention 
to the characteristics of particular regions, 
especially their metropolitan status, centrality 
vs. peripherality and overall competitiveness. 
Positive verifi cation of the H2 hypothesis 
would acknowledge the role of inter-regional 
heterogeneity over the inter-country differences, 
observed in regional trade, affecting regional 
vulnerability. The metropolitan regions are better 
prepared to absorb economic shocks, that is, 
Brexit in our case. As nodes of globalisation, 
they accumulated knowledge and adjustments 
capacity to changes and challenges of the 
world economy.
H3: Regional exposure to Brexit is 
determined by idiosyncratic factors.
The idiosyncrasy mentioned in H3 stems 
from the path dependency of trade relations with 
the UK’s economy, character of the export base 
(structural factors) and activity of particular, 
main enterprises in the region, also with foreign 
capital, having stronger than average trade 
links with the UK.
3. Regional Vulnerability to Brexit
The fi rst aspect of the vulnerability assessment 
is exposure, proxied by the share of the UK in 
total exports. The lowest exposure relates to 
Opolskie in Poland (2.6%). For Spain the lowest 
exposure relates to Extremadura (5.2%). The 
observed regularities among regions seemed 
to be quite persistent over time and among the 
regions of different countries. Actually, only in 
the case of Spain between 2005 and 2015 one 
could observe reduction in the mean share of 
exports to the UK. In 2015, the mean exposition 
to Brexit among Polish and Spanish regions 
was almost the same (Tab. 3). Spanish regions 
anticipated slightly higher maximum values in 
this respect, which resulted in a higher inter-
regional differentiation.
Year
Mean Min Max CV Mean Min Max CV
Spanish regions Polish regions
2005 10.05 3.80 16.41 0.37 5.02 2.28 8.13 0.31
2008 7.94 3.37 13.42 0.33 5.49 3.25 8.12 0.30
2010 7.13 3.34 12.45 0.35 5.41 2.93 9.24 0.33
2013 7.24 4.53 12.47 0.32 6.00 2.79 10.45 0.30
2015 7.39 4.76 10.55 0.25 6.47 2.56 9.94 0.29
Source: own
Note: CV – coeffi cient of variation.
Tab. 3: The average share of regional exports to the UK by Spanish and Polish regions
EM_1_2020.indd   41 14.4.2020   10:12:20
42 2020, XXIII, 1
Economics
The highest exposures are observed for 
Lubelskie in Poland (9.9%) and two Spanish 
regions (Murcia and Comunidad Valenciana, 
10.3% and 10.6% respectively). These regions 
share some interesting common characteristics: 
they both have a relatively low GDP per capita 
level compared to the national average as well 
as to the EU average, Murcia and Lubelskie 
can be regarded as peripheral regions, 
however the question of peripherality shall be 
treated with caution. For instance, according to 
Aversano-Dearborn et al. (2011) both Murcia 
and Comunidad Valenciana are regions well 
prepared for globalisation processes, while 
Lubelskie (as most of the Poland’s NUTS-2 
regions) represents a highly vulnerable to 
globalisation, peripheral region. Castilla-La 
Mancha, for instance, has the lowest exposure 
to the Brexit consequences in our ranking 
(the UK’s share in exports is 4.7%), while by 
Aversano-Dearborn et al. (2011), it has been 
ranked as a very sensitive to globalisation, 
peripheral region. One has to remember, 
while interpreting our taxonomy results, that 
we focus on exports, as a selected aspect of 
vulnerability to Brexit, and obviously exposure 
to intensive trade relations with the UK, cannot 
be interpreted as exposure to globalisation. 
The Poland vs. Spain comparison of exposure 
shows that only two Polish regions have been 
ranked as being very highly exposed, while for 
Spain there are 4 of them.
For further research, it would be interesting 
to fi nd what are the factors making the regions 
having over that on average share of the UK in 
exports. In Spain it is a row of regions forming 
‘a belt’ from La Rioja, through Aragon and 
Comunidad Valenciana to Murcia. In Poland, 
high and very high exposure is an attribute of 
regions forming ‘the belt’ starting from Lubelskie, 
through Swiętokrzyskie, to Lodzkie and Slaskie. 
The road network seems to play an important role 
Fig. 1: Dimensions of vulnerability to Brexit
Source: own
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in this respect. Also, some learning by exporting 
experience and exporters agglomeration effects 
can matter, especially since agglomeration can 
be driven by the destination of exports (Cassey, 
Schmeiser, & Waldkirch, 2016; Koenig, 2009; 
Koenig, Mayneris, & Poncet, 2010).
As regards sensitivity (Fig. 1), 7 Polish 
regions have been classifi ed as being highly 
or very highly sensitive to Brexit consequences 
and 5 in the case Spain. In case of regions 
ranked as highly sensitive, in Poland these are 
three metropolitan, highly competitive regions: 
Mazowieckie, Wielkopolskie and Pomorskie, 
while for Spain it is Murcia. An important, 
common factor shared by these four regions 
is an increased trade openness, with the trade 
channel being the transmitter of impulses from 
foreign markets.
Interestingly, symptomatic results have 
been obtained with reference to their adaptive 
capacity, which is the highest for the two 
capital regions of Madrid and Mazowieckie 
and Catalonia, which refl ects their superior 
position in many aspects (Fig. 1). Madrid 
and Mazowieckie are leaders in terms of the 
FDI/GDP performance index, which shall 
be treated with caution because of a capital 
city FDI registration bias effect. The three 
regions report high intensity of the IIT trade 
with the UK and high innovative capacity. The 
obtained results are in line with the taxonomy 
of Aversano-Dearborn et al. (2011), in which 
Madrid and Catalonia are the only regions of 
Spain classifi ed as globalised regions of the 
knowledge-based economy. Mazowieckie 
is also unique, being the only Polish region 
ranked as oriented towards services, while 
the remaining peripheral Polish regions are 
sensitive to globalisation. Generally, Spanish 
regions, have a higher adaptive capacity than 
the Polish ones. None of the Spanish regions 
have been classifi ed as of low adaptive capacity.
Fig. 2: The relations between sensitivity and exposure to Brexit (left panel) and the impact of Brexit and adaptive capacity (right panel)
Source: own
Region codes: ES-01 Andalucia; ES-02 Aragon; ES-03 Asturias; ES-04 Illes Balears; ES-05 Canarias; ES-06 Cantabria; 
ES-07 Castilla y Leon; ES-08 Castilla-La Mancha; ES-09 Catalonia; ES-10 Comunidad Valenciana; ES-11 Extremadura; 
ES-12 Galicia; ES-13 Madrid; ES-14 Murcia; ES-15 Navarra; ES-16 Pais Vasco; ES-17 La Rioja; PL-02 Dolnoslaskie; 
PL-04 Kujawsko-Pomorskie; PL-06 Lubelskie; PL-08 Lubuskie; PL-10 Lodzkie; PL-12 Malopolskie; PL-14 Mazowieckie; 
PL-16 Opolskie; PL-18 Podkarpackie; PL-20 Podlaskie; PL-22 Pomorskie; PL-24 Slaskie; PL-26 Swietokrzyskie; PL-28 
Warminsko-Mazurskie; PL-30 Wielkopolskie; PL-32 Zachodniopomorskie.
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Fig. 2 presents two relationships between: 
(i) sensitivity and exposure and (ii) impact and 
adaptive capacity. Circles indicate the regions 
of Poland and Spain that are mostly impacted 
by the consequences of Brexit (high, both 
sensitivity and exposure) and those, that are 
most vulnerable to Brexit (high impact and low 
adaptive capacity).
Important implications are derived from 
the obtained results. A higher number of 
Spanish regions than Polish regions were 
exposed to the upcoming UK abandonment. 
However, Polish regions were, on average, 
more sensitive to this shock, which may result 
in a rather potentially similar impact on their 
trade reduction. In terms of adaptive capacity, 
a systematic inter-country difference, with 
Spanish regions being more prepared for the 
shock, was seen. Although the real trade-
effects are diffi cult to foresee, they will depend 
on the elasticities of the particular dimensions 
of vulnerability, signalling unequal and yet-
unknown role of particular forces exposing or 
diminishing the real vulnerability.
Finally, Tab. 4 summarises the relationship 
between impact and adaptive capacity; 
four classes of both categories have been 
distinguished. A key assumption of our 
research was that we focus on the regional 
level of exporting activity. By going beyond 
country characteristics and concentrating on 
sub-national regions, we expected to obtain the 
taxonomy or regions that is ‘mixed’ within the 
particular clusters of vulnerability. However, we 
reject our fi rst hypothesis (H1) because clusters 
are mainly composed by Spanish or Polish 
regions, with few exceptions in which several 
Polish (Spanish) regions are accompanied by 
one or two Spanish (Polish) regions.
The capital regions of Poland and Spain 
(Mazowieckie and Madrid, respectively) 
together with Catalonia experience a relative 
high impact to the consequences of Brexit, 
while revealing the highest adaptive capacity 
that can mitigate the negative effects of 
Brexit. The superior position of Madrid, 
Mazowieckie and Catalonia supports our 
second hypothesis (H2), revealing the merits 
 Impact
A
da
pt
iv
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 1 (v. high) 2 3 4 (low)
1 
(v
. h
ig
h)
 
Madrid; 
Mazowieckie; 
Catalonia;
Pais Vasco  
2 Comunidad 
Valenciana; Murcia;
La Rioja; Aragon; 
Navarra; Pomorskie;
Castilla y Leon; 
Cantabria; Asturias;
3 Canarias;
Lubelskie; Lodzkie; 
Slaskie; Andalucia; 
Dolnoslaskie; 
Malopolskie; 
Wielkopolskie
Swietokrzyskie; 
Podlaskie; Galicia; 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie; 
Zachodniopomorskie; 
Extremadura; 
Podkarpackie;
Balears; Castilla-La 
Mancha; Opolskie;
4 
(lo
w
)
  Warminsko-Mazurskie; Lubuskie;  
Source: own
Note: The grayscale represents the intensity of Brexit vulnerability. Thus, the regions with highest impact 
and lowest adaptive capacity will be mostly vulnerable to Brexit. On the other hand, the regions with high-
est adaptive capacity and lowest impact will be relatively resilient to this shock.
Tab. 4: Impact of Brexit and adaptive capacity of regions
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of metropolitan/central status and overall, high 
competitiveness.
Also, Pais Vasco falls into the category of 
“very high” adaptive capacity, while having 
a relatively low impact. Canarias represents 
a quite different position (very high impact and 
relatively low adaptive capacity). This could 
be an effect of remoteness of the Canary 
Islands, located near the African coast (see 
Fig. A1 of the Appendix A of the article by 
Márquez-Ramos, 2016). Two Polish regions 
(Warminsko-Mazurskie and Lubuskie) are in 
a special position: the relatively low impact is 
accompanied by a very low adaptive capacity.
The position of two ‘belts’ of regions (for Spain 
and for Poland) that reveal a relatively higher share 
of the UK in exports, supports our third hypothesis 
(H3). Further research is recommended to identify 
the factors behind this idiosyncratic position as 
regards exports to the UK.
Conclusion and Discussion
 This study hypothesises important potential and 
heterogeneous consequences of Brexit for sub-
national regions within European countries. To 
evaluate this in a scenario that is yet unknown, 
we have taken on board regional trade of 
two EU countries, Spain and Poland, and we 
have focused on the analysis of three different 
aspects of vulnerability: exposure, sensitivity 
and adaptive capacity.
The prerequisite for the inquiry into Brexit’s 
consequences was the focus on the regional 
level of the exporting activity. We expected to 
obtain the taxonomy or Polish and Spanish 
regions ‘mixed’ within the identifi ed clusters of 
vulnerability. However, it is not the case, because 
clusters are mainly composed by Spanish or 
Polish regions, with a few exceptions in which 
several Polish regions are accompanied by one 
or two Spanish regions (or opposite).
In the spirit of Chen et al. (2018), we 
present the regional impact of potential Brexit 
consequences by constructing the vulnerability 
indicator. However, we do not rely on estimated 
data, but instead utilise real trade-based 
information. Also, the scope of the analysis 
is different – exports vs. potential GDP and 
employment loss in the latter case. According to 
Chen et al. (2018) among the Spanish regions 
mostly affected by the Brexit consequences will 
be: Comunidad de Madrid (0.94% GDP loss), 
Catalonia (0.95%), Comunidad Valenciana 
(0.87%), Murcia (0.76%), whereas in the case 
of Poland: Mazowieckie (1.35%), Wielkopolskie 
(1.37%), Lubuskie (1.38%), Opolskie (1.38%), 
Warminsko-Mazurskie (1.37%). Our results 
support the above fi ndings (note the differences 
in variables of interest) especially for Spanish 
regions and, to some extent, for Polish regions. 
They seem to signal the higher importance of 
regional adaptive capacity. Regions with a low 
adaptive capacity tended to obtain higher 
overall vulnerability in a series of cases for 
the Polish regions. To further analyse whether 
citizens’ attitudes towards European economic 
integration are in line with vulnerability to (future 
and exogenous) shocks, surveys such as that of 
the Eurobarometer (European Parliament, 2018) 
should be conducted at the sub-national level. 
This study presents a number of limitations. 
Firstly, it encompasses only trade relations, 
being the prime channel of transmitting Brexit 
to the regional economies of Spain and Poland. 
Other channels through which Brexit will affect 
the regions deserve attention, for instance the 
tension for the EU stemming from the UK not 
contributing to the EU budget. However, this 
dimension of Brexit consequences for regions 
could only be assessed within the political 
discussion on the next EU’s fi nancial perspective 
and its priorities as well with the debate on the 
future of the EU. Secondly, it uses the example 
of two countries to obtain generalised fi ndings, 
however the fi nal outcome of the Brexit may be 
different in other countries. Thirdly, given the 
unknown fi nal Brexit scenario, the real effects 
of Brexit may vary from the ones presented 
in this paper, giving e.g. different importance 
of particular dimensions of vulnerability 
(elasticities) to fi nal economic effects. Finally, 
this study has focused on one trade dimension 
only: exports. However, it should be mentioned 
that importing activities are equally important 
and are key, for example, for fi rms’ (and hence, 
regions’) involvement in “complex” value 
chains. Brexit will suppose a disruption for 
those non-UK fi rms (and regions) in which UK 
fi rms (and regions) are relevant players in the 
EU production networks.
In the case of particular regions, depending 
on their characteristics, the infl uence of the 
particular components of sensitivity or adaptive 
capacity can be different. For instance, 
FDI might be performing a networking role 
in exporting activities, which is expected 
to mitigate the Brexit shock. Otherwise, in 
particular cases, it might be a factor bringing 
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negative consequences, if investors are 
skittish and reallocate to other places. The 
sectoral composition of exports also matters 
(Felbermayr et al., 2017) and shall be further 
examined, beyond only focusing on agriculture 
and high-tech products. We treat Brexit as 
a shock, bringing negative consequences. 
However, in particular cases, the shock might 
evoke an ‘impact effect’, that will be positive 
in that sense, that new business opportunities 
will be looked for and the intensifi ed efforts 
would be taken in order to fi nd, for example, 
new markets or new business partners. This 
is indeed a challenge for regional institutions 
engaged in the promotion of exports, and a test 
for their effi ciency (Teixeira & Barros, 2014).
The Brexit’s asymmetrical impact on 
regions’ economy through the export channel is 
a challenge for regional policy, however Brexit 
is rather perceived as a national problem. 
In our view, its regional consequences are 
not treated with the necessary attention. It is 
also a challenge for regional institutions, as 
addressed by Billing, McCann and Ortega-
Argilés (2019), especially for those regions 
having extraordinary trade links with the UK. The 
EU cohesion policy does not properly address 
the regional asymmetries in this respect. It 
seems, however, to be a more serious problem 
as cohesion policy does not properly address 
inequalities in regional exporting activity as 
such. It is an area of promising further research, 
in particular with respect to differences in 
regions’ balance of exports and imports. As 
vulnerability to Brexit has its regional context, 
place-sensitive policies are needed (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2018). It is therefore the role for regional 
institutions to monitor the vulnerability to 
the Brexit consequences and to facilitate 
adjustments to the exporting (and importing) 
companies that will be severely affected. They 
can be, for instance, assisted in searching for 
the alternative export (import) markets as well 
as in retaining the intensive trade links with the 
UK in the new trade regulatory framework after 
the UK will leave the EU.
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